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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

/-¥

Conference of F~y 24, 1978
List 2, Sheet 1
No. 77-5992
ADDINGTON (civilly committed as
insane)

State/Civil

Timely

v.

~ to Supreme Ct. Texas (per

TEXAS

curiam)

1. Summary. Does due process require a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to commit a person for an indefinite
time for insanity?
2. Facts.

Frcn k Addington was civilly committed for an

indefinite period of time after a jury determined that he was
.

'·;

,,

-2mentally ill and required hospitalization for his own protection
and welfare and

t~

of the community.

appellant requested an

instr~ction

At the commitment trial,

that the jury find he was insane

and a danger to the community or to himself beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The trial judge refused the instruction, and instead charged

the jury that the burden of proof was "upon the State to prove each
) of the . . • special issues by clear and

so~ncing

The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed.

evidence." (js at B-9

It held that,

-

in light of the serious deprivation of liberty involved in an
indefinite commitment, the stigma that attached, and the inexactitude
of the psychological sciences, the State should have to prove the
necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State appealed to

the Supreme Court of Texas.
3. Opinion below(no dissents).

The Texas Supreme Court

reversed on the basis of State v. Turner, 556 SW 2d 563 (1977),
decided by that court while this case was on appeal.

State v.

Turner is included in the jurisdictional statement.

The Texas

Supreme Court held that a mere preponderance of the evidence was
sufficient, so that even the requirement of "clear and convincing
evidence" was more than the Constitution required.
reasons.

There were four

First, the loss of liberty was less severe in mental

incompetency
proceedings.
358 (1970).

~ommitments

The

~ourt

than in juvenile delinquency and criminal
thereby distinguished In Re Winship, 397 U.S.

In mental commitment cases, the patient has a right to

treatment, a right to periodic review of his continued treatment, and

c

-3-

a right to release when cured.

Secondly, civil commitments were

ordered on the basis of probabilities of future conduct, not
proof of past acts.

This distinguished both criminal and juvenile

delinquency proceedings.

Future probabilities were inherently

more difficult to prove than past events, so the State should

U

be afforded more freedom on the standard of proof.

Third,

. '- i?tw"
~'
.
the State's interest was beneficent, and there was a serious
~·
y,~t.
risk of denying a person the care he needed because the State
""
could not prove the necessary elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Texas Court's last rationale was a summar; of the foregoing:
the State had a parens patriae function to perform and the lower

(_

standard of proof was necessary to accomplish it.
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that other jurisdictions
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and some others imposed

----

...............

~"""""--""

_.

........................

-

a clear and convincing evidence rule, wmle theCA 4 recognized
a mere preponderance.

The breakdown of the Circuit and State

conflicts is as follows:
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED:
, .C. Circuit, I n re Ballav, 482 F.2d 648 (1973)(civil commitment for
insanity); bu t cf., United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir.
·
for civil commitment
1973)(preponderance sufficient/where jury has returned verdict in
criminal case of not guilty by reason of insanity).
CA 7, United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (1975)
(under Illinois' sexually dangerous persoris act, so possibly distinguishable by reason of the greater stigma);

-4Massachusetts, In re Andrews, 334 NE 2d 15 (1975)(also involving
commitment under a sexually dangerous persons statute).
PROOF BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT
Florida,
In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (1977) ("clear and convincing")
( c::------?
Illinois, People v. Sansone, 309 NE 2d 733 (Ill.App. Ct. 1974)
(Constitution requires more than mere preponderance, but
beyond a reasonable doubt is not required)

New Mexico, State v. Valdez, 540 P.2d 818 (1975) (Constitution require _
more than mere preponderance; "clear and convincing" is sufficient)
Utah, In reWard M., 533 P.2d 896 (1975)(opinion by Henriod, C.J.)
West Virginia, State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 SE2d 109 (1974)
("clear, cogent, and convincing" sufficient).
PROOF BY MERE PREPONDERANCE SUFFICIENT
CA 4, Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (1971), cert. dismissed
sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355
(1972).

4. Contentions.

Appellant challenges the premises underlying

the Texas Supreme Court opinion.

There is no recognized right to
)

treatment or right to release when cured under Texas State law;
hence, the _asserted lesser infringement on liberty is not accurate.
The greater difficulty in assessing future probabilities than past
events argues for a stronger standard of proof, lest individuals be
deprived of their liberty on the basis of vague probabilities.

In

-5this argument, appellant mirrors the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
The beneficent State purpose argument used by the Texas Court
cannot stand after In re Winship and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
where the Court explicitly held that good intentions did not
absolve a state from due process requirements before liberty
was forfeited.

And the same response serves to answer the

Texas Supreme Court's parens patriae perspective: the state's
interest might permit deprivations of liberty on the basis of
probabilities, but those probabilities must still be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Parens patriae is no license to smother

individual rights.
5. Discussion.

This issue was presented in Murel v. Baltimore

City Criminal Court, supra, but subsequent events mooted that case.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas argues that a standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required for
indeterminate civil commitment.
strong~

The J ogic of Winship is undeniably

perhaps the clearest distinguishing aspect is the assessment

of probabilities about the future involved in civil commitments as

opposed to the fact-finding process in criminal and juvenile proceedin _
But on that question, the two Texas Courts express equally convincing,
and perfectly opposite, arguments.

This case is a strong candidate

for noting probable jurisdiction, and I recommend that a response from
the Attorney General of Texas be requested.

2/15/78
There is no response.

Campbell

Opinions and
Turner in js

s-~, ~~-e- .

~~J4~A-~
cj.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:

Mr. Justice Powell
Nancy
RE:

April 5, 1978

No. 77-5992, Addington v. Texas

In a 2-page Motion to Dismiss, the State argues that
the question presented is insubstantial.

It notes, first,

that the statute itself does not provide the standard of
proof but only provides for commitment.

(I do not think the

State is arguing that this is not a proper appeal because
it urges the Court to
jurisdiction.)

a

DFWSFQ, not to dismiss for want of

On the merits, the State says thatx this is

a civil proceeding and theeefore should be governed by the
preponderance standard.

The State distinguishes juvenile

proceedings on the ground that there the adjudication is

concerned with past wrongdoing wher.e as here the conunitment
is because of a person's emotional problems.
I am not persuaded by the State's arguments.

Court might postpone rather than note.

I am

On the other hand,

this might be a propr appeal because the statute provides
for conunitment without providing for allegedly required
due process.

--

On the merits, the conflkt described by the
•
4

preliminary memo will have to be resolved at some point,
and the Court might as well do it in a case where the lower
court has opted for the lowest standard of proof.
Nancy

Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 .. .

Suhmitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ........ . ....... , 19 . . .
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May 18, ' 1978 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
Motion of Appellant for
Appointment of Counsel

No. 77-5992
ADDINGTON

v.
TEXAS
On April 17, the Court noted prob. jurisd. to consider whether
the Due Process Clause requires proof of insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt to accomplish a civil commitment to a mental institution.

The

Court also granted appellant's motion for leave to proceed ifp.
Appellant, by his counsel of record in this Court (William P.
Allison), now requests that Martha L. Boston be appointed to represent
him.
Ms. Boston has represented appellant throughout the proceedings
below.

She graduated from the University of Texas School of Law in

January, 1975, and will not be eligible for admission to the Bar of

~~
I,

''

''

'>,

- 2 this Court until May 9, 1978.

Mr. Allison's association with thjs

case apparently came about for no reason other than to furnish the
signature of a member of this Bar.
There is no response.
5/5/78
PJC

Goltz

(}ourt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

'

Voted on ...... ~ ........... , 19 . . .

Argued .... . .............. , 19 .. .

Assigned .. . ........... . ... , 19 . . .

Suhmitted . .. . ............ , 19 . . .

Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

No. 77-5992

ADDINGTON
vs.

TEXAS

Motion of appellant for appointment of counse l .
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TO:

~/F~OM:

~-

Mr. Justice Powell
Eric

DATE:

11-20-78

RE:

Addington v. Texas, No. 77-5992

---

This is a very difficult case concerning the standard of

-

proof constitutionally required in civil commitment proceedings.
The briefs of the parties themselves are unimpressive, but

fortunately several amici have supplied us with thorough, wellwritten briefs.

In particular, the brief for the American

Psychiatric Association (APA), authored by Joel Klein, and the

2.

briefs for the National Center for Law and the Handicapped and
for the National Association for Mental Health (NAMH) et al. are
helpful.

I. PRELIMINARY ISSUE

The facts and the course of the proceedings in the Texas
courts are adedquately described in the briefs.

The only point I

would stress is that although the Texas Supreme Court held that
the "preponderance" standard is all that is required in civil
commitment cases, the trial court actually gave "clear and
c~ce"

insJ:ruction~

to t~jury.

This raises a

question about what procedural course the Court should follow
should it decide that the "clear and convincing evidence" test is
proper.

Klein's view is that because appellant received the

benefit of the clear and convincing evidence standard, reversal
is necessary only if the Court decides that the reasonable doubt
standard is necessary.

see APA Brief at 7 n.1.

~

The National

Association for Mental Health, by contrast, argues that even if
the Court approves the clear and convincing evidence standard it
should consider a remand.

This is because the Texas Supreme

Court has ruled that the clear and convincing test simply has no
place in Texas jurisprudence.

A remand, amicus says, would be

necessary to allow that court to choose between adopting the
clear and convincing test in response to this Court's holding,
and imposing the reasaonable doubt test as the only available
alternative, under state law, to the unacceptable preponderance

test.

see
_.._

NAMH Brief at 5.

The latter position seems correct to me.

If the Texas

court refuses, as a matter of state law, to adopt a clear and
convincing evidence test, it would have to hold that appellant
was entitled to reasonable doubt instuctions and therefore must
be retried.

I

Thus, contrary to Klein's suggestion, the adoption

by this Court of the clear and convincing test could affect the
judgment of appellant's case on remand.

II. PRINCIPAL QUESTION

A

Before deciding the ultimate question of what burden of
proof is appropriate, the Court should take account of a less
obvious, but equally important, aspect of this case.

Although

this appeal does not directly present for review the propriety of

~

the substantive criteria used to commit appellant, the decision
of the Court may well have a direct bearing on the states'

----------~--~--~--------~----

------

ability to rely on psychiatric diagnoses as grounds for civil

-

commitment.

~

~·

This is because, as all responsible contributors to

the briefs in this case agree, psychiatric evidence does not
readily lend itself to the traditional criminal-law formulation
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the imposition of the

}

reasonable doubt standard would make it more difficult to obtain
judgments of civil commitment.

Thus, if the Court opts for the

reasonable doubt standard, this might properly be understood as a

9

f-

~

~

4.

step towards requiring proof of overt acts as a substantive
criterion for civil commitment.

It would therefore seem wise to

give some consideration to the question of the extent to which
psychiatric diagnoses may form the basis for involutary
commitments.
Klein's brief suggests persuasively that "the pragmatic
realities of the adversary process make it apparent that a
competent attorney almost invariably will be able to raise a
reasonable doubt with respect to [the] medical criteria [that are
involved in proving that an individual should be committed]."
APA Brief at 19.

Thus, the imposition of the reasonable doubt~ · )~

standard might seriously impair the state's ability to care for)
its mentally ill citizens.

The briefs for the National Center

for Law and the Handicapped and the NAMH, by contrast, focus
the magnitude of the indiviudal interests at stake.

They

convincingly describe both the infringement on individual
and the serious stigma that attach to civil commitment.

They

believe that the interest in minimizing the risk of erroneous!
imposing such burdens is virtually as great as its counterpart
the criminal law field.
At the core of this disagreement, of course, is the
question of how useful and trustworthy psychiatric diaqnosis
really is.

This is an intractable problem.

On the one hand, the

need to treat the mentally ill, sometimes against their expressed
wisshes, seems apparent, and psychiatry, imperfect though it may
be, is the only predictive tool we have.

Unless we insist that a

person actually harm himself or others before he may be

~ ~tv,~
,~_71~

~~~~~

~~

5.

committed, we must necessarily rely on psychiatry, shored up with
'

whatever procedural safeguards will add . to its accuracy without
(as Klein's brief says would be the case with the resaonble doubt
standard) undermining its effectiveness altogether.

Requiring

that a person go so far as actually to commit self-destructive or
anti-social (criminal) acts before permitting civil commitment
surely would preclude treatment for many individuals about whom
there could be a convincing demonstration, if not one beyond a
reasonable doubt, that commitment desparately is needed and would
be beneficial.
On the other hand, I am impressed with the information
offered by the brief of the
Handicapped at pp. 30-41.

~ational

Center for Law and the

-----------------------

It is persuasively argued that

psychiatric predictions are in fact wrong in a great many cases,
some studies say in a majority of them.

It is disconcerting in

the extreme to think of needlessly incarcerating substantial

'Je-t- _

~

numbers of individuals, even as a trade-off for insuring the~~
availability of involuntary treatment for others who

actually~~
~

~~

need it.

Because this strikes me as an exceptionally important
issue, and because it is not the precise question presented for
review, I would recommend deciding this case in a way that leaves
the question as open as possible for future consideration in a
case where it is squarely presented.

~

OnApossible way to do this

would be to focus on the concept of "dangerousness."

The most

convincinq factual argument of the National Center's brief is
that psychiatry is woefully inaccurate in predicting whether an

.,_.

6.
individual will commit violent acts towards other persons in the
future.

V:ee

their brief at 34-41.

Perhaps (I am unsure about

this) it makes sense to distinguish between psychiatry's
to diagnose the existence of mental illness suitable for
treatment and even to predict a patient's inability adequately
care for himself on the one hand and, on the other, its ability
to predict that violent, anti-social acts will be committed.

If

the latter prediction is even arguably more difficult, it might
be appropriate to rule narrowly that when a person is sought to
be civilly committed on that basis, the state must prove its
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Several arguments could be advanced in support of such a
holding.

First, since dangerousness predictions seems to be so

!3d

unreliable, it might be sound to make the risk of error as small) ~
as possible as to this particular basis for civil commitment.
Second, since a predictive finding of dangerousness resembles a
criminal conviction in important respects, it may carry with it
an unusally onerous stigma which should not be inflicted in the
absence of the most exacting judicial safequards.

Third, to the

extent the opinion in this case will necessarily anticipate
future decisions on the permissibility of basing civil
commitments on certain kinds of diagnostic evidence, it might not
be inappropriate to lay the groundwork for a future holding that
commitments based on dangerousness must be founded at least in
part on proof of past conduct in which violence was threatened,
if not performed.

Cf. Lessard v.

Sch~,

Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414

u.s.

349 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D.
473 (1974),

~

~

~

.... ~ 7 ~

~~~

~-

~+~~~-

reinstated, 379 F.Supp. 1376
remanded, 421
Wis. 1976).

u.s.

(E.o?!di~~-a~~

~~ ~

957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F.Supp. 1318

A reasonable doubt standard clearly would be

0J ~~K
~

appropriate if actual conduct, as opposed to the accuracy of a~

J..o~

medical judgment were put in issue.
In this case, the iury was instructed that it could
comit appellant if it found that he required hospitalization
either for "his own welfare and protection," or for "the
protection of others."

The verdict did not specify which bas1s,

if not both, was relied upon, but the evidence and arguments

-

presented to the jury suggest that dangerousness may well have
been the controlling rationale.

See Brief of NAMH at 13-15.

Thus, the Court cannot assume that appellant was not

.

~
~

commi~

solely "for the protection of others," i.e., because he was
dangerous.

-

If, as suggested above, the Court were to hold no more
than that civil commitments based on a finding of dangerousness
..-..___
to others must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it would
leave open for future development important issues that
not be resolved until squarely presented and thoroughly
In future case the Court would be free to extend this

~~

shou~

brie~

holdi~~

all civil commitment proceedings if it were convinced that

~~~

is required.

~

On the other hand, consistent with Klein's

observation that the standard of proof imposed should be
considered in tandem with the substantive facts that must be
proved to authorize commitment, see APA brief at 17-18, the Court
would not preclude a future decision that the reasonable doubt

8.
standard is not appropriate when commitment is based solely upon
the "grave disability" or "serious need for treatment" that some
state statutes use as a basis for involuntary hospitalization.
~~

appendix to Brief for NAMH.

The narrow holding proposed also

would leave the Court maximum flesibility in future holdings
going to the substantive criteria themselves-- e.g., that
psychiatric diagnosis of the existence of serious, treatable
mental illness, as opposed to predicted dangerousness, is
reliable enough to justify commitment.

Because of the importance

and difficulty of the issues, I would think that proceeding at a
snail's pace as suggested in this memo might be the best way for
the Court to deal with the problems of due process and
involuntary mental health treatment.

There remains the question
treated initially:

whether, apart from the troubling policy

arguments discussed above,

In · r~ ; wi~§hip,

mandates reversal in this case.

397

u.s.

358 (1970),

Appellant and two of the amici

argue that since the nature of the infringement on liberty and
the stigma associated with involuntary civil commitment for
mental illenss are scarcely distinguishable from that involved
with criminal adjudications, the holding in that case, that proof
must be beyond a reasonable doubt, controls here.
difficult
/"'-

-~

--

argum~nt

to answer.

This is a

In fact, insofar as it pertains to

commitments based on predictions of future dangerousness to

~ .~J-~

~~

/..-z_~kr~~
~~~c/o~-

' .

,. '

·.

,·'

9.
others, I find it compelling.

Being incarcerated for treatment

solely because a court or jury believes one will commit violent
(i.e. criminal) acts in the future is simply too similar to being
incarcerated for rehabilitation as a juvenile delinquent to
justify different due process standards.

Especially in light of

psychiatry's poor track record in predicting dangerousness and
the likelihood that the Court will someday require proof of
actual or threatened overt acts to sustain commitments on this
basis, it seems appropriate to require that the proof be beyond a
reasonable doubt.
I do not understand Klein's brief to argue strongly to
the contrary.

As I read between the lines of his brief at pp. 18-

21, especially footnote 9, he seems to warn against imposing the
reasonable doubt standard on civil commitments not based on
dangerousness, while conceding that his opponents have a point to
the extent they object to commitments based on findings that the
individual will commit harmful acts in the future.
But

K~n

may have a point when he argues that Winship

)~

fo~
out tA/~

does not necessarily mandate the reasonable doubt standard
all civil commitments.

His discussion on pp 9-16 points

important, if subtle, differences between some civil commitments
~·

and 'uvenile delinquency proceedings.

In his Mathews v. Eldridge

analysis for discovering due process requirements, Klein is
persuasive that not all involuntary commitments must be
accompanied by the procedural safeguards developed in the
criminal law context.

I will not repeat his arguments here, and

I am not convinced that they are necessarily unimpeachable.

But

..

1 0.

I do think it would be wise to reserve ruling on them as they
apply to civil commitments not based on a finding of
dangerousness.

When the proper case arises, his arguments may

properly prevail.
The arguments of the State of Texas are not sound.

The

main thrust of its brief is that since the Court has not required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the parole and probation
revocation cases, which involve deprivations of liberty, the
reasonable doubt standard is not required in civil commitment
cases merely because they ingringe upon liberty interests.

The

obvious problem with this apporach, of course, is that a
probationer or parolee has already lost his right to liberty
through a criminal conviction and is free at the mercy of the
state.

The defendant in a civil commitment proceeding, by

contrast, has an unconditional right to liberty until the state
makes a sufficient showing that commitment is justified.

The

probation and parole revocation cases are therefore not
particularly helpful.
All amici seems to aqree either expressly or implicitly
one one point:
inadequate.

the preponderance of the evidence test is

Texas is apparently the only state expressly to

adopt such a standard, although it is unclear in several other
exactly what standard is applied.

See
_.......__

appendix to Brief of

National Center for Law and the Handicapped.

Amici seem correct.

-~

Weighing the risk of error, the magnitude of the private
interests involved, and the interests of the state in the balance
as required by Mathews v. Eldridge, it seems highly doubtful that

'.

.

11•

permitting civil commitment solely upon a finding that the
evidence pointing to that conclusion is only slightly stronger
than that going the other way comports with the Constitution.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the difficulties of the issues involved and
the nature of the single question presented, I would rule
narrowly in this case.

Amici NAMH and National Center for Law

and the Handicapped have shown that civil commitments based on
predictions of dangerousness are peculiarly subject to error. For
this reason and because the stiqma and probable conditions of
confinement are much like those associated with incarceration for
criminal offenses and juvenile delinquency, proof should be
beyond a reasonable doubt for civil commitments based solely on
this ground, as the one in this case may well have been.

I would

leave open the question whether the same standard of proof should
apply when commitment is on other grounds.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-5992
Frank O'Neal Addington,
Appellant,

v.

J On

Appeal from the Supreme
Court of Texas.

State of Texas.
[April -, 1979]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal to determine
what standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under
state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a. sta.te mental hospital.

I
On seven occasions between 1969 and 1975 appellant was
committed temporarily, Texas Mental Health Code Ann., Art.
5547-31-39 (Vernon), to various Texas state mental hospitals
and was committed for indefinite periods, id., at 5547- 40-57,
to Austin State Hospital on three different occasions. On
D:')cember 18, 1975, when appellant was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of "assault by threat" against his mother,
the county and state mental health authorities therefore were
well aware of his history of mental and emotional difficulties.
Appellant's mother filed a petition for his indefinite commitment in accordance with Texas law. The county psychiatric examiner interviewed appellant while in custody and
after the interview issued a Certificate of Medical Examination for Mental Illness. In the Certificate, the examiner
stated his opinion that appellant was "mentally ill and re-

~~~t-v~~~~~~
~ ~ J- ~u. ~,. ~/,....._/~ 4Jr?,fZ,_..
..A4 ~ ~ ~~/V--r/ ~ ~ ?'h,..,.,...

~.

q.
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quire[d] hospitalization in a mental hospital." Art. 5547-42.
Appellant retained counsel and a trial was held before a
jury to determine in accord with the statute :
11
(1) whether the proposed patient is mentally ill, and
if so
11
(2) whether he requires hospitalization in a mental
hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others, and if so
11
(3) whether he is mentally incompetent." Art. 554751.
The trial on these issues extended over six days.
The State offered evidence that appellant suffered from
serious delusions, that he often had threatened to injure both
of his parents and others, that he had been involved in several
assaultive episodes while hospitalized and that he had caused
substantial property damage both at his own apartment and
at his parents' home. From these undisputed facts, two
psychiatrists, who qualified as experts, expressed opinions that
appellant suffered from psychotic schizophrenia and that he
had paranoid tendencies. They also expressed medical opin.ions that appellant was probably dangerous both to himself
and to others. They explained that appellant required hospitalization in a closed area to treat his condition because in
the past he had refused to attend out-patient treatment programs and had escaped several times from mental hospitals.
Appellant did not contest the factual assertions made by
the State's witnesses; indeed, he conceded that he suffered
from a mental illness. What appellant attempted to show
was that there was no substantial basis for concluding that
he was probably dangerous to himself or others.
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury with the
instructions in the form of two questions :
11
1) Based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, is Frank O'Neal Addington mentally ill?
11
2) Based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
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dence, does Frank O'Neal Addington require hospitalization in a mental hospital for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others?"
Appellant objected to these instructions on several grounds,
including the trial court's refusal to employ the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof.
The jury found that a.ppellant was mentally ill and that he
required hospitalization for his own or others' welfare. The
trial court then entered an order committing appellant as a
patient to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite period.
Appellant appealed that order to the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the standards for
commitment violated his substantive due process rights and
that any standard of proof for commitment less than that
required for criminal convictions, i. e., beyond a reasonable
doubt, violated his procedural due process rights. The Court
of Civil Appeals agreed with a.ppellant on the standard of
proof issue and reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Because of its treatment of the standard of proof, that court
did not consider any of the other issues raised in the appeal.
On appeal. the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Civil Appeals' decision. In so holding the supreme court
relied primarily upon its previous decision in State v. Turner;
556 S. W. 2d 563 (Tex., cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929 (1977).
In Turner, the Texas Supreme Court held that a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof in a civil
commitment proceeding satisfied due process. The court
declined to adopt the criminal law standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" primarily because it questioned whether the
State could prove by that exacting standard that a particular
person would or would not be dangerous in the future. It
also distinguished a civil commitment from a criminal conviction by noting that under Texas law the mentally ill pa.t ient
has the right to treatment. periodic review of his condition
and immediate release when no longer deemed to be a danger
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to himself or others. Finally, the Turner court rejected the
"clear and convincing" evidence standard because under Texas
rules of procedure juries could be instructed only under a
beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance standard of
proof.
Reaffirming Turner, the Texas Supreme Court in this case
concluded that the trial court's instruction to the jury, although not in conformity with the legal requirements, had
benefited appellant, and hence the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court reinstated the judgment of the trial court.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 435 U. S. 967, and we reverse and remand.
II
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of
factfinding, is to "instruct the fact finder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 370 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring). The standard serves to allocate the
risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative
importance attached to the ultimate decision.
Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law
has produced across a continuum three standards or levels
of proof for different types of cases. At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute
between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, plaintiff's burden
of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the
defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without
any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as
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posssible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. 1 In the
administration of criminal justice our society imposes almost
the entire risk of error upon itself. This is a.ccomplished by
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the State prove
the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
The intermediate standard, which usually employs some
combination of the words "clear," "cogent," "unequivocal"
and "convincing" is less commonly used, but nonetheless "is
no stranger to the civil law." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,
285 (1967). See also McCormick, Evidence § 320 (1954);
9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). One typical use
of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud
or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.
The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more
substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions
accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his
reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's
burden of proof. Similarly, this Court has used the "clear
and convincing" standard of proof to protect particularly
important individual interests in various civil cases. See,
e. g., Woodby v. INS, supra, at 285 (deportation); Chaunt v.
United States, 364 t.T. S. 350. 353 (1960) (denaturalization);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943)
(denaturalization).
Candor suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what
lay jurors understand concerning the differences among these
three tests or the nuances of a judge's instructions on the law
may well be largely an academic exercise, there are no directly
1
Compare Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B. U. L. Rev. 507 (1975) (reasonable doubt represented a 1('1';8 strict standard than previous common-law rules) with May,
Some Rules of Evidence, 10 Am. L. Rev. 642 (1875) (reasonable doubt
constituted a stricter rule than previous ones). See generally Underwood,
The Thumb on the Scales of Ju8tice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 86 Yale L. J. 1299 (1977).
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relevant empirical studies upon which we are prepared to rely.
Indeed, the ultimate truth as to how the staudards of proof
affect decisionmaking may well be unknowable. given that
factfinding is a process shared by countless thousands of individuals throughout the country. We probably can assume no
more than that the difference between a preponderance of the
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably is
better understood than either of them in relation to the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence. Nonetheless, even if the particular stalldard-of-proof catch-words do
not always make a great difference in a particular case. adopting a "standard of proof is more than an empty semantic
exercise." Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153. 1166 (CA4
1971) (Sobeloff. J .. concurring and dissenting), cert. dismis11ed
as improvidently granted sub 11om. Murel v. Baltimore City
Criminal Court, 407 U. S. 355 (1972). In cases involving
individual rights, whether criminal or civil, "the standard of
proof at a minimum reflects the value society places ,on
individual liberty." Ibid.

III
In considering what standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the
individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and the State's interest in committing the emotionally
disturbed under a particular standard of proof. Moreover, we
must be mindful that "the function of legal process ... is to
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, No.
78-201, at 10; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526 (1958).

A
This Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty
that requires due process pr9te~tion. See, e. g., Jackson v.
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Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S.
504 ( 1972) ; In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 ( 1967) ; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967). Moreover, it is indisputable that
involunta.r y commitment to a mental hospital after a finding
of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender
adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we
label this phenomena "stigma" or choose to call it something
else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur
and that it can have a very significant impact on the
individual.
The State has a legitimate interest under its paren.s patriae
powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable, because
of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also
has authority under its police power to protect the community
from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.
Under the Texas Mental Health Code, however, the State has
no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are
not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others. Since the preponderance standard creates
the risk of increasing the number of individuals erroneously
committed, it is at least unclear to what extent, if any, the
State's interests are furthered by using a preponderance standard in such commitment proceedings.
The expanding concern of society in recent years with
mental disorders is reflected in the fact that in the past few
years many states have enacted statutes designed to protect
the rights of the mentally ilL However, only one state has a
statute that permits involuntary commitment by a mere preponderance of the evidence, Miss. Code Ann. § 41-21-75, and
Texas is the only State where a court has concluded that the
preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process.
We attribute this not to any lack of concern in those states,
but rather to a belief that the varying standards tend to
produce comparable results. As we stated earlier, however,
standards of proof are important for their symbolic meaning
as well as for their practical effect. We conclude that the
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individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment
proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process
requires the State to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence. The
individual should not be asked to share equally with society
the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is
significantly greater than any possible harm to the State.

B
Appellant urges the Court to hold that due process requires
use of the criminal law's standard of proof-"beyond a reasonable doubt." He argues that the rationale of the Winship
holding that the criminal law standard of proof was required
in a delinquency proceeding applies with equal force to a civil
proceeding.
In Winship, against the background of a gradual assimilation of juvenile proceedings into traditional criminal prosecutions, we declined to allow the State's "civil labels and good
intentions" to "obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts." 397 U.S., at 365-366. The Court
saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty and stigma
between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency adjudication for a juvenile. Winship recognized that the basic issuewhether the individual in fact committed a criminal act-was
the same in both proceedings. There being no meaningful
distinctions between the two proceedings, we required the
State to prove the juvenile's act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
There are significant reasons why different standards of
proof are called for in civil commitment proceedings as
opposed to criminal prosecutions. In a civil commitment
the State's power cannot be exercised in any punitive sense.
The Sta.te may confine only for the purpose of providing care
designed to treat the individual. Jackson v. Indiana; 400:
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U. S. 715 (1972). 2 Unlike the delinquency proceeding in
Winship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be
equated to a criminal prosecution. Cf. Woodby v. INS, supra,
at 284-285.
In addition, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
historically has been reserved for criminal cases. This unique
standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitution, is regarded as a critical part of the "moral force of the
criminal law," 397 U. S., at 364, and we should hesitate to
apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases. Cf.
ibid.
The heavy standard applied in crimina] cases manifests our
concern that the risk of error to the individual must be
minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go
free. Patterson v. New York , 432 U.S. 198, 208 (1977). The
full force of that idea does not apply to a civil commitment.
It may be true that an erroneous commitment is sometimes as
undesirable as an erroneous conviction. 5 Wigmore, supra, at
~ 1400.
However. even though an erroneous confinement
should be avoided in the first instance, the layers of professional review and observation of the patient's condition, and
the concern of family and friends generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected . Moreover, it is not true that the release of a genuinely
mentally ill person is no worse to the individual than the
failure to convict the guilty. One who is suffering from a
debilitating mental illness and in need of treatment is neither
wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. See Chodoff, The Case
for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 Am.
J. Psychiatry 496, 498 (1976); Schwartz, et al., Psychiatric
2

As the Texa HSupreme Court said in State v. T·urne1·, 556 S. W. 2d 563,

566 (1977) :
"The involuntar~· mental patient is rntitled to treatment, to periodic and
reC'urrent re,·irw of his mr ntal condition, and to release at such time as he
no longer prc;;cnt:s a danger to himsrlf and others."
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Labeling and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, 31
Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 329, 335 (1974). It cannot be said,
therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to
"go free" than for a mentally normal person to be committed,
Finally, the initial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding
is very different from the central issue in either a delinquency
proceeding or a criminal prosecution. In the latter cases the
basic issue is a straightforward factual question-did the accused commit the act alleged. There may be factual issues to
resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects
represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the
individual is menta.Ily ill and dangerous either to himself or
others a.nd is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning
of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists
and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as
to whether a State could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 584 (1976)
(concurring opinion); Blocker v. United States, 110 U. S.
App. D. C. 41 , 288 F . 2d 853, 860-861 (1961) (concurring
opinion). See also Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F. 2d 1153, 1165
(CA4 1973) (Sobeloff, J., concurring and dissenting) , cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Murel v. Balti"more City Criminal Courts, 407 U.S. 355 (1974); Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill.: Theories and Procedures,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1288, 1291 (1968) , Note, Due Process and
the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commitment Adjudications, 42 Ford. L. Rev. 611, 624 (1974).
The subtleties and nuances of psychia.tric diagnosis render
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. The
reasonable doubt standard of criminal law functions in its
realm because there the standard is addressed to specific,
knowable facts. Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a
large extent based on medical "impressions" drawn from
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analysis and filtered through the experience of the
diagnostician. This process often makes it very difficult for
the expert physician to offer definite conclusions about any
particular patient. Within the medical discipline, the traditional standa.rd for "factfinding" is a "reasonable medical
certainty." If a trained psychiatrist has difficulty with the
categorical "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the untrained lay juror-or indeed even a trained judge-who is
required to rely upon expert opinion could be forced by the
criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for many
patients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric
care. See Fordham Note, supra, at 624. Such "freedom" for
a mentally ill person would be purchased at a high price.
That practical considerations may limit a constitutionally
based burden of proof is demonstrated by the reasonable doubt
standard, which is a compromise between what is possible to
prove and what protects the rights of the individual. If the
State was required to guarantee error-free convictions, it would
be required to prove guilt beyond all doubt. However, "[d]ue
process does not require that every conceivable step be taken,
at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an
innocent person." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208
(1977). Nor should the State be required to employ a standard of proof that may completely undercut its efforts to further
the legitimate interests of both the State and the patient that
are served by civil commitments.
That some States have chosen-either legislatively or judicially-to adopt the criminal law 3 gives no assurance that
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 334-60 (4) (I); Idaho Code§ 66-329 (i); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 59-2917; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 38-1305 (7); Okla. Stat.,
'T it. 43A, § 54.1 (C); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 426.130; Utah Code Ann. § 64-736 (6); Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (14) (e); Superintendent of Worcester State
Hospital v. Hagberg, 372 N. E. 2d 242 (Mass. 1978); Proctor v. Butler,
'380 A. 2d 673 (NH 1977); In re Hodges, 325 A. 2d 605 (DC 1974);
'Lausche v. Comm'r of Public Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 225 N. W. 2d 366
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 993 (1975). See also In re J. W., 44 N. J.
3
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the more stringent standard of proof is needed or · is even
adaptable to the needs of all States. The essence of federalism is that States must be free to develop a variety of solutions
to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.
As the substantive standards for civil commitment may vary
from state to state, procedures must be a.llowed to va.r y so
long as they meet the constitutional minimum. See Monahan
& Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil
Commitment, 2 Law & Human Behavior 49, 53--54 (1978);
Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1977 Det. Coll. L. Rev. 209, 210. We
conclude that it ·is unnecessa.r y to require States to apply the
strict, criminal standard.

c

Having concluded that the preponderance standard falls
short of meeting the demands of due process and that the
reasonable doubt standard is not required, we turn to a middle
level of burden of proof that strikes a fair balance between
the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the
State. We note that 20 States, most by statute, employ the
standard of "clear and convincing" evidence; 4 three States use
Super. 216, 130 A. 2d 64 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 465, 132 A.
2d 558 (1957); Danton v. Commonwealth, 383 S. W. 2d 681 (Ky. 1964)
(dicta).
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 36-540 ; Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 27-10-111 (1), Conn.
·Gen. Stat. § 17-178 (c); Del. Code, Tit. 16, § 5010 (2); Ga. Code § 88501 (a); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 91%, § 3-808; Iowa Code § 229.12; La. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit . 28, § 55E (Wetit); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann . Tit. 34, § 2334
(5) (A)(1); Mich. Stat. Ann., § 14.800 (465) ; Neb. Rev . Stat. § 83-1035 ;
N. M. Stat. Ann.§ 34-2A-11C; N.D. Cent. Code§ 25-03.1-19; Ohio Rev.
· Code Ann . § 5122.15 (B); Pa. Cons. Stat. Tit . 50, § 7304 (f); S. C. Code
§ 44-17-580 ; S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 27A-9-18 ; Vt. Stat. Ann . Tit . 18,
§ 7616 (b); Md. Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene Reg. 10.04.03G; ]n,
re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
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'clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence; 5 and two States
require "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence. 6
In Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 276 (1967), dealing with
deportation and Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,
125, 159 (1943), dealing with denaturalization, the Court held
that "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence was the
appropriate standard of proof. The term "unequivocal,"
taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt/ a
burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal
cases. The issues in Schneidermnn and Woodby were basically
factual and therefore susceptible of objective proof and the
consequences to the individual were unusually drastic-loss
of citizenship and expulsion from the United States.
We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is
inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given
the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a
burden the State cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment. Similarly, we
conclude that use of the term "unequivocal" is not constitutionally required, although the States are free to use that
standard. To meet due process demands, the standard has to
inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the
preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to other.
categories of civil cases.
We noted earlier that the trial court employed the standard
of "clear, unequivocal and convincing" evidence in appellant's
commitment hearing before a jury. That instruction was
constitutionally adequate, however, the precise burden greater
than a preponderance of the evidence that the Texas Supreme
Court may choose to require is a matter of state law which
5 N. C. Gen. Stat. § 122-58.7 (i); Wash. Rev . Code § 71 .05.310; State
ex 1·el. Hawks v. Lazam, 202 S. E. 2d 109 (W. Va . 1974) .
6 Ala. Code, Tit. 22, § 52-10 (a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-604 (d).
7 See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2494 (1969).
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we leave to that court. 8 Accordingly, we remand the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

8

We noted earlier the

couxt '~

holdil1g on harmless error. See p. 4, ante.
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